Morals Reflect Genetic Distance


We can and do certainly possess different moral biases, and we can and do certainly possess normative moral biases. This is true. But that does not mean that moral differences are not decidable in matters of conflict. We can use moral biases to seek allies. We can trade across moral biases when we have common interests. And we can decide moral between moral biases when we are in conflict. that means that there exist an objectively decidable morality, but that each of us requires reproductive moral allies, uses moral competitors when necessary, and resorts to objective morality in matters of conflict resolution.

There is no such thing as moral relativism. We possess moral biases, both genetic, familial, and normative. We seek allies, trading partners, and judges in matters of conflict. It is entirely possible to judge within families, within norms, within trading partners, and within competitors, by objective, scientific, rational means: natural law of non-imposition. We may not like this but then knowing that such decidability exists at the familial, normative, trade, and competitor ‘distances’ requires us only to understand the criteria at the familial, normative, trade, and competitor distances. We sacrifice for kin and competitors will not bear sacrifice. We need not benefit from kin but we must benefit from trading partners. And so on. The greater the genetic and moral distance the more objective the criteria of decidability. But those differences remain decidable. Why? Because the only by which we can escape retaliation and preserve cooperation is that of the non-imposition of costs upon one another.


Defining “Bad”

Whenever gain takes precedence over imposition of costs
Whenever profit takes precedence over commons.
Whenever financial markets take precedence over culture.
Whenever law takes precedence over family.
Whenever government takes precedence over industry.
Whenever state takes precedence over tribe.
Whenever empire takes precedence over nation.

The British press are whining about the short-term impact of financial markets.

The British people are worried about the long-term consequences to family, commons, culture, nation, and people.

The madness is endemic.

Kill the Napoleonic state

3.3-Epistemology · 3.4-Ethics · Uncategorized

Taleb vs Doolittle: Demanding Skin-in-the-Game vs Involuntary Warranty

Nassim Taleb and I are working on the same problem, which we identified by similar means: designing models. He was inspired when he designed financial risk models, and I was inspired when I designed artificial intelligences for games in anticipation of the kind of warfare we are seeing emerge today.

I work bottom up (operationally), and Taleb works top-down (statistically). But this is the same problem from two ends of the spectrum. (He publishes books on the mass market to make money, I build software and companies for a limited number of partners and customers.) I want to find the mechanism and he wants to quantify the effect. But we are looking for the same thing. What is it?

Computers are useful in increasing our perceptions. The game of Life is an interesting software experiment in that if you vary the rate (time) you see different patterns emerge. If you vary the scale you see different patterns emerge. But in the end, these patterns, while they appear relatively random at slow (operationally observable) rates, turn out to be highly deterministic at faster ( consequentially observable) rates.

And this single experimental game tells us a lot about the human mind’s limits of perception. We see what we can, and the longer we observe the more consequential the patterns are that emerge, and the more deterministic is any system we observe.

We have all heard how few behaviors ants have but what kind of complexity emerges from it. During a vacation in southern Oregon one year I observed ducks for a few days as a way of distracting myself from business stress. Ducks are not smart like crows. They have just a few behaviors (intuitions is perhaps a better word). And their apparent complexities emerge from just those few behaviors. But if you watch them long enough you see machines that do about four or five things. And that’s all.

So, there is some limit to our perception underneath man’s behavior that is ascertainable: the metrics of human thought.

And I would suggestion without reservation that this research program is at least – if more – profoundly important than the research program into the physical structure of the universe.

This mathematics is achievable, but we don’t yet know how to go about it. And I am pretty certain that it’s a data collection problem: until we have vastly more data about our selves we probably cannot determine it. (emphasis on probably).

We may solve it by analogy with artificial intelligence. Or we may not. I suspect that we will. We will develop a unit of cognition wherein x information is required for every IQ point in order to create a bridge between one substantive network of relations and another.

But Taleb and I issue the same warning – although I think I have an institutional solution that can be implemented as formal policy and he has an informative narrative but no solution – as yet. Although his paper last year that shows just how extraordinarily large our information must be once we start getting into outliers.

We both use some version of ‘skin in the game’ as a guardianship against wishful thinking and cognitive bias. I use the legal term warranty and he uses the financial street name ‘skin in the game’ But the idea is the same.

In Taleb’s case, I think he is more concerned with stupidity and hubris as we have seen in the statistical (non-operational) financialization of our economy. Whereas I am more concerned with deception, as we have seen in the conversion of the social sciences to statistical pseudosciences in every field: psychology, sociology, economics, politics, and (as I have extended the scope of political theory) to group evolutionary strategy.

But whether top down or bottom up, statistical or pseudoscientific, skin in the game or warranty, hubris or deceit, the problem remains the same:

It is too easy for people in modernity to rely on pseudoscience in order to execute deceptions that cause us to consume every form of capital, from the genetic, to the normative, to the ethical and moral, to the informational (knowledge itself), to the institutional, to built capital, to portable capital, to money, to accounts, to the territorial, and destroying civilization, and in particular the uniqueness of western civilization in the process.

So to assert our ( Taleb and I) argument more directly: given that these people have put no skin in the game, and provided no warranty, but that we can impose upon them the warranty against their will for their malfeasance, what form of restitution shall we extract from them?

Territorial, physical, institutional, traditional, informational, normative, and genetic?

How do we demand restitution for what they have done?

How would you balance the accounts plus provide such incentive under rule of law that this would never happen again?

As for the Great Wars – all debts are paid.

Curt Doolittle
The Philosophy of Aristocracy
The Propertarian Institute
Kiev, Ukraine


Close to the Final Word On Ethical Systems. (The “Deontological Fallacy” In Ethics)

—“My philosophical problem with consequentialism is it’s lacking solid base.”— A Friend (Free Northerner)

[I]’d like to give you a different suggestion.

That we practice four levels of ethics depending upon the skill in the area of our actions.

1) Pedagogical Myths...(very young)..............Stories (WESTERN PATHOLOGICAL ALTRUISM)
2) Virtue Ethics.............(young)......................Biographies
3) Rule Ethics...............(inexperience adult)...Laws
4) Outcome Ethics........(experienced adult)....Science

But more importantly, ethical systems can be used as an excuse to steal. We are aware that altrusim can be abused easily. This is why I always suggest we test ethical statements for both the obverse (what is stated) and the reverse (what is not stated).
So the lower the precision (information content) of the ethical system, the more opportunity there is to claim that one is ethical while acting unethically.

My argument is that rothbardian libertarianism is built on this principle.

So instead I argue that we must use the most sophisticated (informationally dense) ethical system that we can, given our abilities, and fall back if we lack it.

So there is no difference in ethical models, only a difference in our skill level in any given area of thought. And that all ethical systems are simply increasingly precise variations on the same theory that we must achieve our greatest potential but do so without externalizing costs.

Therefore all ethical systems have a ‘solid base’. Impose no cost, and in particular impose no cost that will cost YOU due to retaliation by physical means(violence), procedural means(restitution), or normative means (reputation that costs you opportunities).

The method of imposing no cost on others is to limit ones actions that impose no involuntary costs, and engage in actions that impose costs only if they are product of, fully informed, warrantied, voluntary, and free of imposition of cost by externality.
As far as I know this is the correction of the artificial distinction between ethical systems. There is none. There are only different rules we can follow (techniques) given the information at our disposal.



Please keep up your good work. I enjoy Free Northerner.

Curt Doolittle
The Propertarian Institute
Kiev, Ukraine.


What Constitutes Ethics


—” what constitutes ethics and what makes certain ethical values it universal?”—

[C]ooperation (forgoing opportunity to use violence) is non logical under conditions of parasitism, imposed costs, or free riding. Voluntary exchange is only rational if mutually productive, and free of negative externality.

Now, if one exists in a tribal family structure (say levantine or arabic) or in an outbred family structure (northern Europe), whether one is ‘free riding’ on whom may constitute different ethical preferences. One group may prefer a less moral and ethical society, and another may prefer a more moral and ethical society. In other words, in a low-trust in-bred polity (Jews, gypsies, arabs) one is expected to act on behalf of the family at all costs. (See Banfield’s The Moral Basis of a Backward Society). However, this inbreeding is a reproductive strategy. (See Emmanuel Todd) Just as jewish and Gypsy near breeding is a reproductive strategy. (See Macdonald) These groups practice dual ethical systems: high trust-in-group and low-trust out-group. Only northern europeans, who practice the absolute nuclear family, evolved high trust ethics – a total prohibition on parasitism, imposed costs, and free riding. Because only northern Europeans succeeded in breaking the family and tribal fealties through manorialism, outbreeding and property rights. It was an economic advantage for westerners to develop universalism. But that universalism independent of separatism, is uncompetitive.

Ethical rules are universal. We choose a m ore ethical society or a less ethical society given the diversity or heterogeneity of the population.

(Period. End of Argument. Much to the displeasure of many.)

Curt Doolittle
The Philosophy of Aristocracy
The Propertarian Institute
Kiev Ukraine